Twenty-four hour alerts return

  • Published
  • By Maj. Gen. Roger W. Burg
  • Twentieth Air Force commander
F.E. WARREN AIR FORCE BASE, Wyo. --  It was in this spirit that Twentieth Air Force initiated an introspective review of the ICBM mission to strengthen our combat capability. By looking through the AFSO21 lens, we aimed at resolving inefficiencies in our processes and translating any potential savings into a more lethal, professional and capable Air Force of the future.

In operations, we examined our alert construct, to include launch control center configuration, crew size and alert duration. We determined that a three-person crew posted at each missile alert facility for 72 hours would address several inefficiencies without sacrificing effectiveness or the ICBM standard of perfection. We expected the 72-hour alerts would reduce manpower needed in each wing to sustain the crew force, reduce risk by decreasing the number of miles driven in the ICBM complex and reduce vehicle fuel costs.

The new construct met two of the three primary objectives. We were able to reduce our travel footprint by almost two million miles, and also cut the vehicle fuel bill for the operations groups nearly in half. But despite our initial calculations, we were unable to achieve any manpower savings, and an independent analysis of our units indicated the 72-hour alert construct would actually require an additional 56 crew members per wing to execute within Air Force manpower standards.

Because of the manpower issues, there has been additional strain placed on our training and evaluation process. With more crew members in the field on any given day, including additional instructors and evaluators, the pool of personnel available to give and receive training and evaluation has been reduced. While we are still meeting all training and evaluation requirements, little time is left for additional professional development of our nuclear officers.

Additionally, we have determined that before we expose crew members to multiple consecutive alert days, more study into environmental effects in the launch control centers over extended periods of time is needed.

The 72-hour duty schedule has served facility managers, chefs and security forces well for a number of years. However, the crew force, which is in direct command and control of our nation's most lethal nuclear arsenal, has mandated rest and recovery requirements which are nearly impossible to meet under 72-hour alerts without increased manpower.

Overall, the benefits don't outweigh the risks; and therefore, effective no later than May 1, all 20th AF wings will implement two-person crews with a 24-hour alert schedule. This will not be a "return" to a previous way of doing business but a step forward as we meld a familiar schedule with a new mindset to apply lessons learned from the 72-hour alert test. Our transition to 24-hour alerts will be methodical and, like our alert duties, demands perfection as the standard.

Transformation within 20th AF will continue as we remain convinced there are more efficient ways to operate, maintain and secure our weapon system while continuing to perform our nuclear deterrence mission to the highest standards.